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T HE recent spate of highly publicized hostile tender offers has
prompted questions about the proper reaction of target firm
management to takeover bids. Traditionally, the law has not con-
strained management's ability to resist acquisition. To the con-
trary, courts recognize not just "a large reservoir of authority" in
management to respond to takeover bids, but "an obligation to de-
termine whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation
and its shareholders," and to resist if it is not.1
Particularly since the publication of an important article on the
issue by Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel,2 however, the wis-
dom of allowing managerial resistance has been challenged. All else
being equal, resistance by any target firm reduces the bidder's net
* The authors are all associate professors at Emory University, teaching either in the
Economics Department or at the School of Law. Macey is currently Visiting Associate Pro-
fessor at the University of Virginia School of Law; McChesney is Visiting Associate Profes-
sor and John M. Olin Fellow in Law and Economics at the University of Chicago Law
School. We received valuable comments from Henry Butler, William Carney, Louis De
Alessi, Frank Easterbrook, Daniel Fischel, David Friedman, Charles Goetz, Clifford Holder-
ness, Roger Meiners, Richard Posner, David Schap, and Alan Schwartz; from the partici-
pants in presentations made at the University of Chicago, Cornell University, and Emory
University; and from participants in presentations made at the 1986 Western Economic As-
sociation meetings and the Conference on the Economics of Corporate and Capital Markets
Law at Harvard University. As we hope is clear from these lengthy acknowledgements, the
abundant citations below and the lengthy reference list appended to our paper, we have
benefited considerably from the many economists and lawyers who have addressed many of
the topics we consider here. Distinguishing individual marginal products, as always, is
difficult.
' Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-54 (Del. 1985); see also infra
note 49 (courts' discussions of mandatory managerial passivity in the face of takeovers). For
the purposes of this article, "management" refers to firms' boards of directors and non-
board decision-makers; the interests of the two groups are assumed to coincide.
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter Proper Role]. For elaboration of the
basic model see Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 Stan.
L. Rev. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Auctions].
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expected returns. Consequently, it is argued, other potential
targets would face a greater likelihood of an advantageous take-
over, and all firms would receive greater monitoring, if resistance
were impermissible.3 In addition, it is urged, managers could not
be trusted to seek a proper level of monitoring even if it were at-
tainable, as agency problems are apparently insurmountable when
managers' jobs are on the line.4 The Easterbrook-Fischel school
therefore would ban managerial resistance to tender offers.
The opposition to managerial resistance is troubling. In the par-
adigm market, sellers (or their agents) are permitted to reject ini-
tial offers and bargain for higher ones. Sellers cannot bargain if
they cannot reject an offer. The no-bargaining proposal for shares
thus raises fundamental economic issues of considerable signifi-
cance outside the corporate sphere. Resolution of these issues re-
quires a more general understanding of the functions of property
and of bargaining rights for assets traded in "thin" markets. Such
an understanding is the objective of this article.
Part I shows that the market for corporate control is similar to
other markets where bargaining-resistance-is the norm. In such
markets, important benefits arise from allowing asset owners (in-
cluding corporate shareholders) to bargain freely. Bargaining gar-
ners for sellers a greater share of the gains from exchange, and
thus enhances owners' initial incentives to make value-maximizing
investments in an asset.
The logical structure of Part I can be summarized point by
point:
(1) The ability to bargain is tantamount to the right to resist relin-
quishing an entitlement;
(2) the expected strength of future bargaining rights affects the
magnitude of the present investment one is prepared to make to
enhance the value of an entitlement, with stronger bargaining
rights implying greater willingness to invest;
(3) bargaining over an exchange of entitlements is symmetrical, so
that strengthening the bargaining position of one party (here, bid-
ders) simultaneously weakens the bargaining position of the other
party (targets); and hence,
(4) the proposed no-resistance rule might indeed augment invest-
3 Proper Role, supra note 2, at 1176-77.
Id. at 1175.
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ments in search by prospective bidders, but it would do so at a
cost-it would simultaneously retard investments by prospective
targets.
Ordinarily, one does not expect that owners of property rights
will benefit if those rights are weakened. For a weakening of rights
to benefit the owner, there must exist some market failure that
cannot be overcome by voluntary contract. It is alleged that bar-
gaining creates just such a failure in the market for corporate con-
trol. Targets' resistance to takeover bids, it is claimed, imposes ex-
ternal costs on other firms because those other firms receive less
monitoring from bidders.
Part II examines this supposed market failure. It points out that
external effects are ubiquitous, but that if the legislature or judi-
ciary is primarily interested in the public welfare, only a subset of
these effects merits legal intervention. Several additional theoreti-
cal and empirical criteria must first be satisfied, before interven-
tion is warranted.6 Yet, in the present debate about tender offer
resistance, few of these criteria have been recognized or empirically
investigated. The conditions necessary to justify intervention to
eliminate an externality are stringent. It is by no means obvious
that those conditions are met where resistance to tender offers is
concerned.
If the argument through Part II is accepted, then the wisdom of
the Easterbrook and Fischel proposal is seen to hinge on several
uninvestigated premises. Of particular interest would be a compar-
ison between the two effects a no-resistance rule might have: in-
creased bidder search, and decreased investment in targets. Be-
cause the gain from increased search need not exceed the loss from
decreased target investment, the reserved judicial response that
has greeted the no-resistance proposal is in fact appropriate.
Logically, then, Parts I and II are the linchpins of the argument.
Part III focuses on one of the conditions necessary to justify inter-
vening against an externality, the requirement that the costs of
private internalization exceed the costs of public intervention. We
point out that:
" Id. at 1176-77.
' See Buchanan & Stubblebine, Externality, 29 Economica 371 (1962).
19871
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(1) mechanisms exist that permit an individual target to alter its
own bargaining rules implicitly, thus achieving the level of moni-
toring desired;
(2) targets have an incentive to make such alterations as long as
increased bidder investments add greater value than the value of
target investments lost; and,
(3) consequently, the cost to a firm of achieving the level of moni-
toring it desires (i.e., of avoiding any externality from other firms'
resistance) seems modest.
When these private contract costs are contrasted with the costs
of a mandatory no-resistance rule, therefore, such a rule appears
inadvisable. Voluntary contracting seems able to cope with any
losses arising from the perceived externality. Admittedly, some
owners may prefer a binding no-resistance policy to attract greater
attention from bidders. If so, they can announce and credibly bond
a promise to constrain resistance, thus achieving contractually
their preferred level of monitoring and bidding. Few, if any, firms
do this. Consequently, as one would expect when the law weakens
property rights, the majority of asset owners would be harmed by
legal compulsion to adopt a no-resistance rule.
Part IV considers the agency cost objection to permitting resis-
tance to tender offers. Initial entrepreneurs going public maximize
their personal gains by maximizing the net present value of the
firm, i.e., by considering both the costs and the benefits of various
control techniques available to the public firm, including use of
managerial agents. An agency "problem" would seem to exist in
corporate control matters if analysts focus solely on the cost side.
But the use of agents, even in the context of corporate control, has
its benefits. The proper response to agency costs is not to eradicate
them; that can be done only by eliminating the use (and thus the
benefits) of agents. The appropriate response is to structure
agency contracts optimally, so as to maximize the benefits net of
costs. There is considerable evidence that firms facing the prospect
of agency costs do just that.
The article concludes, in Part V, by noting that new law may
indeed be called for, though not that proposed by Easterbrook and
Fischel. Instead, new law may be desirable to enhance the ability
of private parties to internalize the effects of any relevant exter-
nalities in the market for corporate control. The distinction be-
tween this proposal and that of Easterbrook and Fischel is the dis-
tinction between expanded choice and compulsion.
[Vol. 73:701
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I. BARGAINING AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN ASSETS
Bargaining over the price of assets is a familiar prelude to ex-
change. For example, in a real estate transaction, a seller could
state a price as part of the contract with his selling agent that the
seller would then be bound to accept. The seller, however, prefers
to list a selling price higher than the one he would in fact insist
upon, and then to haggle with potential buyers over the actual
transaction price. Although the seller of a painting lists his reserva-
tion price in the contract with his auctioneer-agent, the auctioneer
neither opens nor (ordinarily) closes bidding at that price. Bargain-
ing with prospective customers again determines who will own the
asset, and how much will be paid if ownership is transferred. Rules
that allow negotiation have evolved for art, real estate, and other
assets. These rules are protected by law; a prospective buyer may
not automatically obtain such assets simply by bidding first or
even highest. The owner may rightfully refuse to sell.
In other words, owners of assets typically are protected by prop-
erty rules rather than liability rules.7 Owners are therefore permit-
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092 (1972). Calabresi and Melamed define the two
types of rules:
An entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who
wishes to remove the entitlement from the holder must buy it from him in a volun-
tary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by the seller. It
is the form of entitlement which gives rise to the least amount of state intervention:
once the original entitlement is decided upon, the state does not try to decide its
value.
Id. at 1092. Once bargaining is abandoned, however, the state must intrude into the valua-
tion process. As Calabresi and Melamed note:
Whenever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an
objectively determined value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.
This value may be what is thought the original holder of the entitlement would have
sold it for. But the holder's complaint that he would have demanded more will not
avail him once the objectively determined value is set. Obviously, liability rules in-
volve an additional stage of state intervention: not only are entitlements protected,
but their transfer or destruction is allowed on the basis of a value determined by
some organ of the state rather than by the parties themselves.
Id.
Although shareholders may refuse the tender offer, and consequently seem to have prop-
erty protection for their shares, by using a two-tiered bid the bidder can create a prisoner's
dilemma among shareholders. This makes it desirable individually for shareholders to
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ted to bargain over asset prices, rather than being forced to accept
a price determined without interaction with the buyer. Contractual
rules that countenance bargaining are found in almost all markets
involving non-fungible goods or services.8 This raises a point of
more general economic significance. Where markets are "thin"
(i.e., where the number of potential purchasers is small and there
is no preexisting market price at which reasonable quantities of the
asset can be purchased), parties to any exchange typically bargain
as bilateral monopolists to establish the price. Bargaining is costly,
yet it dominates other rules for exchange in thin markets. Why,
then, is bargaining the rule in virtually every thin market?
A. The Role of Bargaining in a Theory of Property Rights
Thick markets are characterized by frequent transactions of
nearly homogeneous units. At any moment there is a "standard
price quotation" for each of the traded items, which saves transac-
tion costs. But items transacted in thin markets are not divisible or
numerous enough to ensure that everyone values them equally at
the margin. Because different persons value an item differently,
they bargain whenever they attempt to trade.
It is possible to transact in thin markets without bargaining. If
bargaining costs are high relative to the costs of other procedures
for exchanging entitlements, an efficient legal system will dispense
with property protection of entitlements, which endows traders
with the bilateral vetoes necessary for bargaining to occur. Instead,
transactions will be governed by liability protections, which enable
one party to take an entitlement unilaterally. Compensation will
be determined "objectively," or at least through a process not
tender at the price unilaterally selected by the bidder, even though the shareholders would
all be better off if none tendered and the bidder were forced to bargain with the sharehold-
ers' agent, usually the firm's management. See Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis
of Corporate Greenmail, 95 Yale L.J. 13, 19-27 (1985). So if defensive tactics are impermissi-
ble, the prisoner's dilemma enables the bidder to convert property protection into liability
protection.
8 Examples of other markets that exhibit similar bargaining rules are plentiful. In
purchasing new automobiles, customers frequently obtain bids from one dealer and use
them to bargain for lower prices from other dealers. More ironically perhaps, managerial
positions themselves (and academic positions, for that matter) are not offered on a take-it-
or-leave-it basis, but are subject to considerable bargaining about salary, perquisites, duties,
and so forth, with bids from one prospective employer being used in negotiations with
others.
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under the control of either party." Ordinarily, liability remedies
merely make whole the first party to lose his entitlement, meaning
that all gains from trade go to the taker.10
By bargaining, each party tries to maximize his share of the
gains from trade, net of bargaining costs. Bargaining consumes re-
sources, and would be socially inefficient if it accomplished noth-
ing but this short-run division of gains from any given trade. But
in two distinct ways, bargaining is productive in the long run be-
cause it increases the magnitude of the gains to be partitioned.
First, it assures that the traded items are worth more in other
hands (i.e., that gains from trade exist). Liability rules cannot en-
sure the Pareto efficiency of exchanges because subjective values
are hard to measure and so may not be fully compensated.11 Bar-
gaining guarantees that no exchange occurs unless subjective val-
ues are recognized. This is an important function of bargaining,
but it is not the focus here. Rather, this article focuses on the sec-
ond role of bargaining, that of enhancing the subjective and objec-
tive values of the items to be exchanged.
At the moment of exchange, division of the gains is a zero-sum
activity, without allocative consequences. But the ability to cap-
ture a greater portion of gains from trade tomorrow increases a
party's incentive to augment the value of the asset today.12 Crea-
' Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 7, at 1106-07.
See, e.g., Haddock & Spiegel, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Edgeworth Box, 1 Proc. Eur. A. L. & Econ. 47 (1984); Oi, The Economics of
Product Safety, 4 Bell J. Econ. 3 (1973); Rose-Ackerman, I'd Rather Be Liable Than You: A
Note on Property Rules and Liability Rules, 6 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 255 (1986); Velianovski,
The Employment and Safety Effects of Employers' Liability, 29 Scot. J. Pol. Econ. 256
(1982).
" See, e.g., Muris, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of
Subjective Value, 12 J. Legal Stud. 379 (1983); Rea, Nonpecuniary Loss and Breach of Con-
tract, 11 J. Legal Stud. 35 (1982).
'2 This is a central paradigm in several strains of economic literature, particularly those
analyzing alternative property rights. See, e.g., Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property
Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 347 (1967); Gordon, The Economic Theory of a
Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. Pol. Econ. 124 (1954). For a summary of the
empirical literature, see De Alessi, The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evi-
dence, 2 Res. L. & Econ. 1 (1980). De Alessi summarizes in particular the link of concern
here, that between ownership rewards and investment:
To the extent that resource rights are held in common, individual choices regarding
the output to be produced, the production techniques to be used, the characteristics
(amount, type, and time profile) of the investment to be undertaken as well as the
time horizon and intensity of production will be affected. . . . Thus, since the indi-
19871
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tion (and destruction) of an asset's value is a continuous process.
The size of the gains to be divided in the current period is deter-
mined by the myriad investment and other decisions made by as-
set owners before coming to the bargaining table. Restricting a
party's ability to negotiate will decrease the returns from his value-
increasing efforts, and will thus curtail such investments by him.
The ability to bargain for an exchange is tantamount to a right to
try to maximize the benefit of one's investments in an asset.' 3
B. Value Creation by Target Firms
Exchanges of blocks of corporate shares illustrate the role of bar-
gaining in thin markets. When transacting relatively small num-
bers of a publicly traded corporation's shares, one deals in one of
the thickest of markets. Hence, there is no bargaining, because by
definition bargaining cannot alter relative prices in thick markets;
there is no point to incurring bargaining costs if there are no bene-
fits. Indeed, the buyer or seller rarely identifies his trading part-
ner; every potential partner values the marginal share at the mar-
ket price, so a partner's identity is irrelevant. But in the exchange
of large blocks of shares, bargaining (with its concomitant costs)
often occurs, suggesting that the block market is thinner, and that
individual valuations differ at the margin. The market for control-
ling blocks is thinner still, and so costly bargaining is even more
frequently observed. The market thins as a block of shares grows
larger because a larger block confers greater ability to direct the
corporation's behavior, a power most investors cannot properly ex-
ploit, and thus do not want.
Bargaining over blocks of shares allocates the gains from the
transaction, and has consequences for the initial creation of valu-
vidual lacks exclusive rights to the output of any investment he might make on the
commonly owned resource, he has less incentive to invest this way.
Id. at 6 (footnote omitted). For recent recognition of this paradigm in the corporate take-
over context, see Bebchuk, Comment: The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers,
95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028, 1049 (1982) [hereinafter Competing Tender Offers]; Bebchuk, The
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23,
42-43 (1982) [hereinafter Reply and Extension].
" Bargaining costs thus resemble information costs. An individual's incentive to incur
such costs arises solely from his interest in obtaining the best deal, with much of the gain at
the expense of the trading partner. In the short run, the process largely results only in
transfers between trading partners. But the long-run implications are important, because
the process affects the future availability and value of the traded item.
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able assets. A no-resistance rule would diminish incentives to cre-
ate corporate wealth in two ways. First, it would decrease whatever
investments would otherwise be made in anticipation of realizing
the returns through future exchange. Second, inability to resist a
takeover would diminish certain types of specific investments, the
returns from which hostile acquirers could expropriate.
1. Wealth Creation Through Takeovers
From the beginning, the theoretical takeover literature has fo-
cused almost exclusively on the value-increasing contributions of
acquirers in ferreting out inept or dishonest management.14 Were
all gains created this way, perhaps a no-resistance liability rule for
protecting target firm entitlements would be appropriate; the rule
would provide bidders with the maximum incentive to make value-
increasing investments by giving them, rather than targets, the
largest feasible portion of the gains.
A no-resistance rule would be efficient, however, only if bidders
created all the gains in takeovers, and targets none. If targets also
make value-increasing investments, either at the time of a takeover
or earlier, the desirability of mere liability protection depends on
the elasticity of value creation by each side with respect to the re-
wards realized. The empirical literature is resolutely agnostic about
the source of gains from takeovers.15 Given that this source may
vary substantially from one transaction to another," compelling a
no-resistance response seems unjustified.
Even adopting a short-run perspective of the takeover process, it
is clear that bidders do not create all the gains. Firms do not al-
ways sit back and wait to be taken over. Some go looking for a
bidder. 17 Indeed, a manager can enhance his own position by
4 See, e.g., Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. Pol. Econ. 110
(1965).
'5 See, e.g., Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers,
76 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 323, 328 (1986) (there are "approximately a dozen
theories to explain takeovers, all of which I believe are of some relevance").
11 Jensen and Ruback note that "[v]arious sources of gains to takeovers have been ad-
vanced," but the studies showing gains from takeovers "cannot ...distinguish between
these alternative sources of gains." Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control:
The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5, 23-24 (1983). They remark that it "would be
surprising to find that all the gains. . are due to a single phenomenon such as elimination
of inefficient target management." Id. at 25.
17 When assets are unique, i.e., traded in thin markets, "sellers can also engage in search
1987]
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pointing out the undervalued nature of his firm to bidders, who
will value his ability to discern such circumstances. When the firm
is undervalued because assets should be reallocated out of the firm,
insiders sometimes know this, and work toward an external rem-
edy. By the same token, acquirers often do not actively search for
targets, but merely hold themselves out as willing to entertain
overtures from prospective targets.18 Targets would have little in-
centive to inform potential bidders of their undervalued shares if
the bidders received most of the resulting gain. Finally, some firms
specialize in matchmaking, i.e., in facilitating corporate pairing be-
tween two other firms.19 Matchmakers profit by taking a portion of
the gains from the pairing.
In short, while corporate acquisitions require investments in
search, it is not just bidders who invest. There is no reason, then,
to award all the gains from trade to bidders. If different parties
can create value in the asset being transferred, the optimal rule
would create incentives for all to increase value until the marginal
return to each equaled its marginal opportunity cost.
Adopting a longer-run perspective, the importance of the target
firm's own investments is even greater. The opportunity arises
every day for a firm to make value-creating investments, the full
...in the literal fashion that buyers do." Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol.
Econ. 213, 216 (1961), reprinted in G. Stigler, The Organization of Industry 171, 175 (1968).
For mention of this point in the takeover context, see Competing Tender Offers, supra note
12, at 1049; Reply and Extension, supra note 12, at 38-39. The search cost a party will
undertake is a positive function of the expected reward. This is a fundamental aspect of the
economics of information. See Stigler, supra, at 219, reprinted in G. Stigler, supra, at 180;
G. Stigler, The Theory of Price 1-4 (3d ed. 1966); Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and
Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 1776 (1985) [hereinafter
Undistorted Choice]; Mortensen, Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and
Related Games, 72 Am. Econ. Rev. 968 (1982).
" The following advertisement ran last year in the Wall Street Journal: "Acquisitions
Wanted. Ocilla Industries, Inc., a publicly traded OTC-National company with a significant
cash position, is seeking acquisitions meeting the following criteria. ... Brokers' inquiries
welcome and brokers will be fully protected. Please call or write ...... Wall St. J., May 27,
1986, at 62, col. 4.
19 See, e.g., Petre, Merger Fees That Bend the Mind, Fortune, Jan. 20, 1986, at 18, 21
(investment bankers increasingly involved in acquisitions because they "devise clever strata-
gems and think up new kinds of transactions"); Sterngold, Wall Street's Army of Insiders,
N.Y. Times, May 18, 1986, at F1, F8, col. 4 ("Merger teams originate many deals on their
own today, rather than waiting for a client to ask for help, because they need a constant
flow of transactions to keep the large staffs profitably employed."); Gupta, Intermediaries
Play a Bigger Role in the Venture Business, Wall St. J., Sept. 11, 1986, at 1, col. 5 (match-
makers and advisors "wield increasing power").
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returns from which may only be realized through a possible future
takeover. Firms sometimes can create value by making initial in-
vestments that others are better able to develop, and so plan from
the start to be acquired by another. For example, many computer
software companies plan to be taken over if they successfully inno-
vate even one important software package. This expectation en-
ables them to concentrate on technical innovation and to ignore
subsequent marketing, which is of no value until a technical ad-
vance has been completed. Much small-scale research in other
fields follows a similar pattern.20 The same process typifies both
large-scale and personal real estate investments; property owners
hesitate to make improvements unless they can "get their money
out" when they sell.21
In other words, takeovers are not discrete events that begin at
the moment the first bid materializes. All firms are "in play" from
the day they are created, and the possibility of a later takeover
only spurs greater innovation now. The more attractive the post-
takeover asset configuration foreseen, the more effective the spur.
Forming a new company with the intention of being taken over
is like planning to "go public" once the success of the company is
manifest. Both techniques permit financing of untested projects by
an entrepreneur adept at judging projects' potential, while freeing
him from post-innovation management, a duty for which he may
be poorly qualified. In other words, "inept" management may re-
sult from high opportunity costs, rather than from some moral fail-
ing or incompetence. That many fledgling companies anticipate
the likelihood of going public is clear from contracts signed when
the company is formed specifying who will pay the costs of the
initial public offering.
Even entrepreneurs who do not intend their firms to become
targets nevertheless foresee some probability that their firms will
fail to achieve their principal goals. The potential for being ac-
quired or for selling off assets provides insurance against such an
event.22 If the insurance payoff were reduced by a shift from prop-
20 One group puts together new Ph.D.'s to create new research firms, then sells the firms
to pharmaceutical companies. Boland, A Lot of Happy People, Fin. World, May 13, 1986, at
108.
2' For example, real estate ventures often issue prospectuses stating as their "investment
objectives" the acquisition, holding, and ultimate disposal of various real estate properties.
'2 The insurance function of subsequent acquisitions and sales is seen in the movie and
1987]
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erty to liability protection, some risky ventures would never be ini-
tiated. Additionally, reduced rewards from secondary asset uses
would shift the form of initial investments. Those ventures still
undertaken after the takeover "insurance" payoffs were reduced
would be investments in assets more highly specialized to their pri-
mary objective, and hence less suited to uses elsewhere.2"
2. Protecting Existing Quasi-Rents of Human Capital
Aside from increasing targets' shares of the gains from trade,
there is another way that bargaining (resistance) increases invest-
ments in potential targets. Bargaining makes takeovers less likely
in cases where there are no gains, only transfers, at stake.
In their daily operations, firms face two types of risk, systematic
and firm-specific. Coping with each type of risk requires different
managerial skills. Adapting to systematic risk requires generalized
skills readily marketable elsewhere. But, as Demsetz and Lehn
have explained, firm-specific variations require investments in
firm-specific human capital that are not readily transferable. 24 In-
television business. Frequently, moviemakers and investors organize to make a picture, in-
tending to sell the product to a distributor. See Nulty, New World's Boffo B Movie Script,
Fortune, Feb. 17, 1986, at 48 (New World Pictures banking on the profitability of the home
video market for "B" movies). If the distributor fails to make money in the theaters, he will
pull the film back and sell it instead for use in the home video market. Id. at 50. Similarly,
most television series produced for prime time fail to make money there. But it is increas-
ingly possible to resell them for syndicated rerun in order to reduce losses, or even to make
money, on the venture. See Sherman, A TV Titan Wagers a Wad on Movies, Fortune, May
12, 1986, at 40 (Telepictures able to syndicate Eugene Ionesco's play Rhinoceros-"outright
junk by TV standards").
In general, the process of reclaiming failed ventures, managing them back to profitability,
and then selling them off has become highly specialized. Practitioners are known as "turn-
around venture capitalists," or "vulture capitalists." See Stevens, Lots of Business, Fin.
World, June 10, 1986, at 32.
23 Holding all else equal, an owner clearly will prefer to make investments that maximize
returns if the firm's experience turns out as the owner expects. But just as clearly, again
holding all else equal, the owner will prefer investments that are adaptable, in case the
firm's experience turns out other than expected. It follows that an investment that simulta-
neously offers greater returns and greater adaptability will always be preferred to an invest-
ment offering less of each. Consequently, the entrepeneur will have to make hard choices
only among alternatives with the following attributes: the less adaptable options will have to
offer higher returns to be attractive, which is to say, the more adaptable investments will
offer lower returns. If the advantages of adaptability are curtailed (through a no-resistance
rule, for example), entrepreneurs will shift investments on the margin toward those with
higher expected returns but lower adaptability.
24 See Demsetz, Corporate Control, Insider Trading, and Rates of Return, 76 Am. Econ.
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dividuals will make such investments only if the expected rewards
exceed their best alternative by enough to provide a normal return.
Yet investments that are specific to assets owned by others place
the investor at risk from those others' opportunistic behavior.25 As
long as the individual realizes at least as much as can be had in the
best alternative, the invested human capital will remain, even if
the returns are expropriated. The best alternative, of course, offers
no premium for the firm-specific investment. Long-term guaran-
tees may control the potential for opportunism by one party, but
contracts that guarantee the other party's income invite shirking,
i.e., opportunism by that party.26
Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 313, 315 (1986); Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the The-
ory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & Econ. 375 (1983) [hereinafter Structure of Ownership]; Demsetz
& Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. Pol. Econ.
1155 (1985).
'5 See Alchian, Decision Sharing and Expropriable Specific Quasi-Rents: A Theory of
First National Maintenance Corporation v. NLRB, 1 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 235, 238-40
(1982); Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Com-
petitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & Econ. 297, 313 (1978).
24 If there is no danger that the trained employee will quit, initial investment in specific
human capital will be borne entirely by the firm through wage rates in excess of realized
marginal products during an initial training period. See G. Becker, Human Capital 18-29
(1964). After the investments have been completed, the firm reaps a return by paying wages
equal to those available elsewhere, which are below the employee's (now enhanced) marginal
product within the firm to which his human capital is specific.
If the turnover rate is not zero, however, the situation is different:
If a firm had paid for the specific training of a worker who quit to take another job,
its capital expenditure would be partly wasted, for no further return could be col-
lected. Likewise, a worker fired after he had paid for specific training would be un-
able to collect any further return and would also suffer a capital loss. The willingness
of workers or firms to pay for specific training should, therefore, closely depend on
the likelihood of labor turnover.
Id. at 21. Becker notes that the likelihood of a quit is not fixed; because it depends on
wages, a firm contemplating specific human capital investments in its employees might "of-
fer employees some of the return from training. Matters would be improved in some
respects but worsened in others, for the higher wage would make the supply of trainees
greater than the demand, and rationing would be required." Id. at 22. Moreover, the magni-
tude of investment would not be pursued to the proper margin.
The final step would be to shift some training costs as well as returns to employees,
thereby bringing supply more in line with demand. When the final step is completed,
firms no longer pay all training costs nor do they collect all the returns but they share
both with employees. The shares of each depend on the relations between quit rates
and wages, layoff rates and profits, and on other factors not discussed here.
Id. (footnote omitted).
The firm-specific human capital embodied in a firm's top executives often is unique. At
any given moment particular executives will be uniquely qualified to perform particular
managerial tasks for the firm. The situation is akin to a bilateral monopoly, and an execu-
HeinOnline -- 73 Va. L. Rev.  713 1987
714 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 73:701
Consequently, those making firm-specific human capital invest-
ments sometimes defend against potential opportunism by taking
control of the asset to which their investment is specific. 2 7 In the
corporate context, those who specialize for the benefit of the firm
often acquire a substantial block of shares in that firm. This im-
plies a higher concentration of shareholding in firms benefiting
from more firm-specific human capital, a prediction confirmed
empirically.2
In effect, not all shares are equal. Controlling shareholders will
divert greater rewards per share to themselves than to other share-
holders. This is not thievery, but part of an implicit contract to
induce investments in firm-specific human capital of general bene-
fit to the firm and hence to all shareholders. The thick public mar-
ket in shares will be populated only by "ordinary" shareholders,
while controlling shareholders will sell their larger blocks more
rarely and only for a higher price.29 The daily "market price"
tive's well-timed strategic threat to withhold his services can leave the firm in an extremely
poor bargaining posture. Consequently, in such instances the interests of shareholders will
require that the executive's rewards approximate his marginal product, including the margi-
nal product of his firm-specific human capital. In that way the executive himself will bear
the full cost of a withdrawal of his services.
But this analysis implies that there is no payoff to the firm for prior investment in firm-
specific capital uniquely embodied in executives. If the initial investment is to be made, it
must be made entirely by the executive; but, symmetrically, that leaves the executive at risk
of expropriation of the returns to his investment, should the firm begin to bargain
strategically.
2 7 This taking of control resembles vertical integration, which is one mechanism identified
by Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 25, at 299, for controlling opportunism. Of course,
ownership of shares is not the only device available to managers to mitigate the risk of
expropriation. Pension rights, golden parachutes, severance pay, and the like, all raise the
cost to the firm of carrying out an opportunistic threat. But to say there are alternatives
does not mean that they are perfect substitutes for all firms in all situations. That, in turn,
means that depriving managers of the ability to make and protect investments in blocks of
shares must increase the overall cost of managerial services.
28 Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 24, at 1158-60. In Structure of Ownership, supra note 24,
at 388, Demsetz finds that managers and directors do indeed own substantial blocks of the
employing firm's shares (usually 20% or more), except in the very largest corporations.
There is a link between controlling managerial malfeasance (upon which the takeover
literature concentrates) and controlling passive shareholder opportunism. For both reasons,
shares of firms that are relatively difficult to control are worth more to controlling share-
holder-managers than to passive investors, and so one expects a high degree of integration
of management and shareholding in those firms. See Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Infor-
mation Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 785-86 (1972).
29 The divergence of a block's value from the product of quoted share price times the
shares in the block is constrained by the transaction costs of assembling or dispersing a
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quoted on the telex is lower than the reservation value that con-
trolling shareholders place on the shares in their blocks, because
the price at which they will sell includes a premium, the size of
which must be determined through bargaining.3 "
Yet each share typically has the same voting power. If establish-
ing property rights were costless, those shareholders with more at
stake would also have a more potent voice. Larger individual hold-
ings in any firm imply the higher costs of diminished portfolio di-
versification; 31 controlling shareholders still might own only a mi-
nority of the voting potential. Hence, "controlling" shareholders
are usually only semi-controlling. But the free-rider situation cre-
ated by widely dispersed share ownership normally affords (semi-)
controlling shareholders sufficient protection from human capital
expropriation by fellow shareholders.
This opens an avenue through which an outside bidder (for once,
the term "raider" is appropriate) can profit. If defensive tactics are
barred, a hostile bidder can overcome the free-rider problem
among incumbent shareholders and expropriate the full value of
block of similar size piecemeal. Even if there are enough shares held outside blocks to en-
able one to assemble a block of specified size, assembling a block will not be a perfect sub-
stitute for purchasing one. For example, the concentration of voting power will differ. More-
over, block assembly requires more interaction with the market than does block purchase,
and thus assembly increases the number of third parties "tipped" about one's activities.
30 In some cases, a minor divergence of interests among shareholders may be usefully
reconciled through resort to a "single owner" analogy. See, e.g., Undistorted Choice, supra
note 17, at 1764-80. This is particularly true when shareholders have similar interests ex
ante, but free-rider and hold-out problems create disputes ex post. See Grossman & Hart,
Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 Bell J. Econ.
42 (1980). When there are fundamental differences among shareholder interests ex ante,
however (as there are in the instance considered here), there is no logical way to amalgamate
divergent interests into a conceptual "sole owner." Cf. K. Arrow, Social Choice and Individ-
ual Values (2d ed. 1963) (discussing inherent failings of standard majoritarian voting
processes).
31 Acquiring control of one of the few largest corporations in the economy requires a non-
diversified investment of impressive size, with daunting cost to the risk-averse. Although
there are exceptions, Demsetz has shown that the stock interest of management in very
large corporations tends to be low, averaging 2-3%, compared with smaller companies,
where managers and directors typically hold 20-30% of their corporations' voting shares.
See Structure of Ownership, supra note 24, at 388.
If, in the face of their more tenuous, minority voting control, managers of a giant corpora-
tion are to make value-increasing investments in firm-specific human capital, they must
have greater latitude to resist hostile takeovers than managers holding controlling interests;
otherwise, they cannot protect their quasi-rents from expropriation. When the relative cost
of alternative tools differs between situations, the optimal mix of tools will differ also.
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controlling shareholders' firm-specific investments. The situation
is similar to an eminent domain taking, where asset owners are
paid only the "objective" or market value of what is taken. Owners
who attach a higher subjective value to the asset taken will not be
paid full value. Property-rule protection of the asset, forcing
would-be takers to negotiate with owners, would guarantee that
full compensation was paid. A liability rule permits the taker (the
government in an eminent domain proceeding, the "raider" in a
takeover) to acquire property for less than full value.3 2
Controlling shareholders can limit this risk by including provi-
sions in the corporate charter or bylaws permitting resistance to
hostile takeovers. In effect, they will minimize the overall cost of
potential quasi-rent expropriation by mixing (costly) diversifica-
tion-reducing but control-increasing tools with (also costly) take-
over-resisting measures. This mix is beneficial to all shareholders
because it induces appropriate investments in firm-specific capital
in the first place.3
The interests of controlling shareholders, who own large percent-
ages of residual claims, are highly correlated with the interests of
other shareholders and hence of the firm as a whole. To the extent
that the correlation is not perfect, noncontrolling shareholders dis-
count the price they pay for shares initially. To restrain that dis-
count when seeking original or additional capital, controlling
shareholders have an incentive to deny themselves any ability to
resist takeovers not beneficial to the firm as a whole. Through the
lower initial share price, the noncontrolling shareholders are com-
pensated for any remaining costs of permitted resistance.
Other situations may present similar opportunities for "raiders."
32 See R. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 216-18
(1985); see also Munch, An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 473
(1976) (eminent domain is not, in fact, more efficient than the free market for consolidating
many separately owned parcels of land into a single unit).
33 This notion of expropriation of managerial quasi-rents is similar to that analyzed by
Knoeber. See Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellants, and Hostile Tender Offers, 76
Am. Econ. Rev. 155, 158-59 (1986). However, Knoeber focuses on potential expropriation of
managerial compensation that has been deferred until better information on performance
becomes available. Id. at 159. Deferral of compensation for past services creates a risk that
payment will not be made in the event of a hostile takeover. Id. at 159-60. At this point, our
article focuses instead on firm-specific investments, the returns from which are to be real-
ized in subsequent periods, and which are thus subject to similar opportunism in the event
of a takeover.
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In addition to quasi-rents from human capital, returns to other
valuable assets may be expropriable. Suppose that management
has discovered changes in firm structure or activities that will en-
hance the value of the firm, but has not made the information
public. An outside bidder who discovers that information could ac-
quire shares from shareholders who are ignorant of the changes. To
limit losses to an outside bidder, shareholders would want manage-
ment to resist any takeover until the changes have been effectu-
ated and the shares have risen in price.3 4
There is an unwarranted presumption in much of the takeover
literature that outside entrepreneurs employed by bidding firms
can know something important that the market does not, but that
inside entrepreneurs employed by a target cannot.3 5 If that were
true, there would be no insider trading. But whenever firms invest
in valuable information that cannot be made public, an opportu-
nity exists for an outsider who learns of the information. In that
case, shareholders will want management to protect their returns
from information for which they have paid.
C. Search Rates for Targets
The issue of appropriate property rights in target firms' shares
can be approached from another perspective. The search for un-
dervalued targets, like the search for new ideas, is costly. When
" This hypothetical setting parallels an actual episode. Prior to the recent threat by Sir
James Goldsmith to acquire control of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Goodyear had
hired two investment banking firms to study possible restructuring of Goodyear. Restruc-
turing was recommended, but the information was to be kept private. Before Goodyear
could act on the restructuring recommendations, however, Goldsmith acquired a substantial
minority stake in Goodyear. The stake was interpreted as preliminary to a takeover bid,
after which Goldsmith would himself have restructured the company. There is no evidence
that Goldsmith was privy to any inside information. See Winter & Stricharchuk, Goodyear,
Responding to Takeover Bid, Seeks Buyer for Its Oil and Gas Unit, Wall St. J., Nov. 4,
1986, at 3, col. 2. Goldsmith said that the company's restructuring plans were largely the
same as his. Stewart & Revzin, Sir James Goldsmith, As Enigmatic as Ever, Bails Out of
Goodyear, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 6. Partly because the prospects of Gold-
smith's restructuring were becoming dimmer, Goldsmith eventually agreed to resell his
shares at a premium to the firm, which then proceeded with its prior restructuring plans.
Stricharchuk & Stewart, Goodyear Tire To Buy Interest from Sir James, Wall St. J., Nov.
21, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
35 Cf. Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale L.J. 698, 705
(1982) (describing potential gains from control transactions, but attributing none to incum-
bent management).
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several different claimants to a profitable idea or asset emerge,
some scheme for allocating the property right must also emerge.
One possible scheme is first come, first served.
Various authors have shown, however, that establishing property
rights by first possession ordinarily results in premature capture. 6
Moving resources to higher-valued uses as fast as possible is unde-
sirable. Speed is costly. Rapid search consumes more resources per
unit of discovery than does leisurely search.37 Hence, attempting
maximum speed in replacing poor management, or reallocating
corporate resources for any other reason, is ill-advised. Finding
better managers too soon makes them too expensive; found too
soon, management is only "better" in an engineering, not an eco-
nomic, sense.
The search for targets consumes resources which have valuable
alternative uses. Resources will be diverted too soon if title to the
entire increase in a corporation's value arising from reallocating
control can be established only by racing to the firm before a com-
petitor reaches it. Well-defined property rights control the race by
forcing contenders to deal with an owner or agent capable of im-
plementing an internally consistent plan of action.38 Weakening
their property rights by removing shareholders' ability to bargain
would open a "common," to be claimed by the first arrival.39 Fac-
36 Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 Rev. Econ. & Stats. 348 (1968); Dasgupta &
Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R & D, 11 Bell J. Econ. 1, 25-26
(1980); Mortensen, supra note 17, at 969-70. To use Mortensen's terminology, hostile take-
overs have some of the aspects of an "innovation race" and some aspects of a "mating
game." Id. at 969-75. Only if takeovers were purely a mating game, and only if bidders were
the only parties searching, would a no-resistance rule be desirable. Id. at 973. One crucial
assumption of Mortensen's mating game is that the success of a party of one type (such as
targets) does not affect the distribution of complementary types available to be found. Id. at
976. This assumption does not accurately represent matters in the market for corporate
control. For a generalized application of the Barzel-Dasgupta/Stiglitz-Mortensen analysis to
examples extending beyond property rights in research and development, see Haddock,
First Possession Versus Optimal Timing: Limiting the Dissipation of Economic Value, 64
Wash. U.L.Q. 775 (1986). For an analysis of one historical instance in which first-come-first-
served property rights proved inefficient, see McChesney, Government Prohibitions on Vol-
unteer Fire Fighting in Nineteenth-Century America: A Property Rights Perspective, 15 J.
Legal Stud. 69 (1986).
37 Alchian, Costs and Outputs, in The Allocation of Economic Resources 23, 25 (1959); see
Alchian, Reliability of Progress Curves in Airframe Production, 31 Econometrica 679 (1963).
38 See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 33-39 (3d ed. 1986); Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & Econ. 265, 276 (1977).
" See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243, 1244-45 (1968). The
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ing no resistance, first bidders would be more likely to be the only
bidders, since no defense could be used to elicit competing bids.
II. EXTERNALITIES FROM MANAGERIAL RESISTANCE TO TENDER
OFFERS
The preceding Part illustrated various ways in which the ability
to bargain is advantageous when assets, including blocks of corpo-
rate shares, are traded in thin markets. Bargaining awards a
greater share of the gains from trade to the seller, and is a desir-
able practice whenever sellers are at least partially responsible for
searching out exchange partners. More importantly, the ability to
bargain gives the owners of assets greater incentives to enhance the
assets' value prior to an exchange. It also facilitates the defeat of
those takeover bids that represent not value-maximizing ex-
changes, but only transfers from those who make valuable firm-
specific investments. Because those individuals value the firm's ex-
isting configuration more highly than do a majority of sharehold-
ers, these individuals' inability to bargain for a better deal would
discourage their firm-specific investments in the first place.
These advantages explain why bargaining is the norm in most
thin markets, and why the law typically does not impose liability
rules there that would prevent negotiation. Nevertheless, Easter-
brook and Fischel have argued that the courts or legislatures
should prohibit managerial bargaining over takeovers by banning
managerial resistance to takeover bids.40 The Easterbrook-Fischel
model is well known, and needs little summary here. In effect, it
argues, the market for corporate control is different from other
markets for two reasons.
First, the expectation of a target firm's resistaDce acts as a disin-
centive to bidders, who therefore monitor all firms in the market
less.41 Reduced monitoring by bidders means that other firms pay
"commons" effect can occur when common users of a given asset do not individually register
marginal costs as the asset is depleted; thus, they overuse the asset to the point of exhaus-
tion. The phenomenon draws its name from the overgrazing that typically took place on
public commons. But see Gordon, supra note 12 (if the rate of exploitation of an asset is
decreased, as is appropriate in a commons, but no other aspect of the right to the asset is
established, the cost of exploitation is increased until, at the margin, the entire value of the
resource is dissipated).
40 Proper Role, supra note 2, at 1180-82; Auctions, supra note 2, at 21.
Proper Role, supra note 2, at 1176-77.
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for the target's resistance, creating an externality that allegedly re-
quires a legal no-resistance rule for correction. This externality
would arise even if target shareholders themselves, acting in their
own interest, resisted takeover bids. But typically it is manage-
ment that resists in the name of its shareholders. This, Easter-
brook and Fischel claim, makes resistance undesirable for a second
reason: managers resist not only when resistance benefits their
shareholders, but also when it wrongfully safeguards management
jobs.42 Thus, resistance not only creates externalities costly to
other firms, but increases managerial agency costs to the target
itself.
This Part, and the next two, considers both these objections to
bargaining over corporate assets. Neither externalities nor exces-
sive agency costs necessarily accompany takeover resistance. Fur-
thermore, even if externalities and agency costs were substantial
problems, they would not necessarily justify a legal ban on bar-
gaining. The ability to bargain still has the value-enhancing advan-
tages discussed in Part I. Even if these externality and agency cost
problems exist, therefore, whether they justify a no-resistance rule
is an empirical question; if the benefits of bargaining exceed the
externality and agency costs, there is no good reason to ban
resistance.
A. The Externality Problem
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the application of a com-
mon-law business judgment rule to condone resistance would be
wrong, even when resistance would benefit target shareholders.43
Empirical evidence shows that, on average, tender offers benefit
target firm shareholders ex post.44 But the possibility of resistance
results in some bids being foiled ex ante, with shareholders thus
losing the takeover premiums. Moreover, Easterbrook and Fischel
claim that "[e]ven resistance that ultimately elicits a higher bid is
socially wasteful. ' 4
5
42 Id. at 1175.
43 Id. at 1195 (business judgment rule "should never serve to justify a decision to oppose a
tender offer").
4' The empirical evidence indicates that target firm shareholders receive, on average, a
29% premium from a successful tender offer. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 16, at 10-13.
The returns to successful bidders are much smaller, averaging only about 4%. Id. at 16-17.
45 Proper Role, supra note 2, at 1175.
[Vol. 73:701
HeinOnline -- 73 Va. L. Rev.  720 1987
Tender Offer Resistance
There are two sources of alleged waste. First, the target firm's
resistance consumes resources, while the gains from resistance are
asserted to be merely transfers from bidding firms, rather than the
creation of new wealth. This is just a bargaining cost, however,
neither more nor less troublesome in the takeover context than in
any other thin market. Second, and more importantly, resistance
by the target firm imposes an external cost on other firms, the
managers of which are monitored less by potential takeover
bidders:
[The] "externality" arises when a target's management resists a
tender offer. The resulting increase in the prices paid for target
firms will generally discourage prospective bidders for other
targets; when the price of anything goes up, the quantity de-
manded falls. Changes in the incentives of bidders affect the utility
of monitoring by outsiders, and that affects the size of [other firms'
managerial] agency costs and in turn the pre-offer price of poten-
tial targets' stock.4"
In other words, the externality arises because resistance by one
target reduces the returns of monitoring by prospective bidders,
and thus "there is too little monitoring and investors' wealth
falls. '47 To end the perceived externality, Easterbrook and Fischel
advocate legal intervention to prohibit a target firm's management
from using any defensive tactics.48
The legal community has resisted the proposed no-resistance
rule. Courts refuse to apply it4" and commentators disagree with
41 Id. at 1176-77.
47 Auctions, supra note 2, at 6.
4' Not all defensive tactics fit the Easterbrook-Fischel paradigm. Greenmail paid to pro-
spective bidders, for example, has only trivial resource costs and can increase, not decrease,
the amount of monitoring bidders do. Macey & McChesney, supra note 7 at 38-43.
" See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Citing Easter-
brook and Fischel, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that "[i]t has been suggested that a
board's response to a takeover threat should be a passive one .... [But] as the proponents
of this rule of passivity readily concede, it has not been adopted either by courts or state
legislatures." Id. at 955 n.10; see also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986) (board of directors had the power to adopt a "poison pill"
defense in response to a hostile takeover bid); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1357 (Del. 1985) (directors adopting poison pill defense in anticipation of a possible take-
over attempt protected by business judgment rule).
In a lengthy discussion of Easterbrook and Fischel's analysis, Judge Posner stated that
"[p]ersonally we are rather skeptical about the arguments for defensive measures." Dynam-
ics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 255 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 55 U.S.L.W. 4478
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portions of the analysis.50 For example, it has been noted that al-
though resistance consumes real resources, resistance also avoids
the transaction costs of subsequent transfers if the first bidder is
not the highest-valuing user of the target firm's resources. 51 The
debate has also focused on elasticities, i.e., on just how many bids
are lost because firms can resist.52  On the more fundamental exter-
nality point, however, there has been only acquiescence with the
Easterbrook and Fischel model.53
(U.S. Apr. 21, 1987) (Nos. 86-71, 86-97). But the Seventh Circuit refused in that case to rule
the target company's poison pill plan invalid per se, despite "grave doubts" about defensive
measures, because the court was construing Delaware law. Id. The court recognized that
"Delaware courts have been quite emphatic that defensive measures in general . . . are
within the power of the board of directors of a target corporation." Id. at 256.
50 See, e.g., Competing Tender Offers, supra note 12, at 1029-30; Gilson, Seeking Compet-
itive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51, 66 (1982);
Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Shareholders in Tender Offers:
A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 Cornell L. Rev. 53, 55-56 (1985).
'x In other words, the real resource costs of resistance may be offset by savings in the
transaction costs of subsequent serial transfers. See Competing Tender Offers, supra note
12, at 1048-49. Easterbrook and Fischel suspect the reverse, that auction costs exceed the
costs of successive transfers. Auctions, supra note 2, at 14. The issue is solely empirical, but
neither side has presented any data to support its position.
11 The elasticity debate has centered on the size of bidders' sunk costs, that is, on the
extent to which costs can be recouped in the event bidders are thwarted by managerial
resistance. The crux of the inquiry is, therefore, the overall effect of resistance on reducing
bidders' search efforts. See, e.g., Reply and Extension, supra note 12, at 30 (conceding that
allowing managerial resistance reduces bidders' search, but arguing that the reduction "is
unlikely to be substantial"). Again, no data are offered to support the claim that elasticities
are low, so the empirical claim cannot be evaluated. But the Easterbrook and Fischel model
does not depend on the size of the supposed externality; as long as there is any, it claims,
too little monitoring and bidding will result. Auctions, supra note 2, at 7.
"I See, e.g., Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a
Merge?, 28 J.L. & Econ. 151, 151-54 (1985). Jarrell finds that when target firms resist initial
tender offers by litigating against the bidder, the expected gains from higher subsequent
bids outweigh the costs of both the litigation and the risk that no subsequent offer will
materialize. Id. at 174-75. Defensive tactics, Jarrell initially suggests, may seem to be "sensi-
ble gambles, rather than shameful self-dealing by managers." Id. at 175. But Jarrell ulti-
mately concludes that resistance is nevertheless welfare-reducing:
[T]his conclusion-that litigious defeRses can be beneficial to target sharehold-
ers-does not imply that such actions enhance social welfare. Indeed, the opposite is
more likely to be true, because litigious defenses redistribute some of the gains from
corporate combinations from acquirers to the targets. This redistribution is analogous
to a tax on acquirers.
Id. But the redistribution is not analogous to a tax, because it does not simply disappear
into an uninvolved treasury. It is received by the other party to the transaction, someone
capable of reacting appropriately to the implied opportunity cost. See Coase, The Problem
of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 39-42 (1960).
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B. Relevant vs. Irrelevant Externalities
"Externality" is a slippery concept, one less often used to elucidate
a supposed "problem" than to justify government intervention to
"solve" it. 54 The efficiency issue is not whether any third-party im-
pact takes place-that is inevitable-but whether the appropriate
marginal conditions still hold. Many externalities are solely pecu-
niary; they change prices but do not raise efficiency concerns as
long as prices still equal marginal cost.5 5 A problem arises only
when prices and costs diverge, creating a non-pecuniary (or "tech-
nological") externality.
There are really two distinct externalities connected with re-
sisting takeovers in the Easterbrook and Fischel model, although
the model does not distinguish them. The first, fewer bids for
targets, is merely pecuniary. This allegedly undesirable effect of
resistance comes about because of the "resulting increase in the
prices paid for target firms," meaning that "the quantity de-
manded falls."' Bidders are aware of the possibility-indeed, the
virtual certainty-that their first bid will not be accepted, and at
the margin adjust the amount of search and bidding they under-
take to reflect the higher price of takeovers. Resources will be used
differently, but no inefficiency arises. The pecuniary externality is
real enough, but does not justify legal intervention on efficiency
grounds.
The second externality arises because bidders adjust monitoring
of potential target firms as takeover premiums rise. This external-
ity admittedly is non-pecuniary, but that is not the end of the
analysis. Five conditions still must be met before the legal system
should intervene to correct even a non-pecuniary externality.57
First, the actions of one party must affect other parties who have
4 Cf. E. Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis 107 n.5 (1971) ("There are quite a number of
economic phenomena . . . masquerading in the literature as external effects which cannot
be admitted [as such].").
11 Id. at 103-05. Changes in prices "will lead to changes in the equilibrium output of
goods and services, but each equilibrium will be equally efficient, or Pareto optimal." J. Due
& A. Friedlaender, Government Finance: Economics of the Public Sector 80-81 (5th ed.
1973).
5' Proper Role, supra note 2, at 1176-77; see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
57 If the actors in the legal system, such as the legislature, are themselves self-interested,
these five conditions, while still necessary, will not be sufficient to assure the desirability of
legal intervention.
1987] 723
HeinOnline -- 73 Va. L. Rev.  723 1987
Virginia Law Review
little or no influence over the decisions of the first party. 8 Second,
the impact on the affected parties must alter their behavior.5 Eas-
terbrook and Fischel imply that these first two conditions for legal
intervention are met, which is concededly plausible.
But these two necessary conditions are not sufficient to justify
intervention that would reduce the level of an activity. An exter-
nality must also be an external cost, meaning that the affected par-
ties would want the level of that cost-generating activity reduced.60
In the corporate context, it is unclear whether third-party targets
would want less takeover resistance, because it is unclear whether
resistance results in a net cost to them. Only if resistance results in
a net cost to targets would they want less of it. True, resistance
decreases gains of bidders at the moment of takeover, which
reduces bidder search for a given level of corporate investment.
But as Part I noted, in the more dynamic market setting an ability
to resist enhances target gains from a successful takeover and thus
increases the amount of investment in place at any moment. This,
in turn, makes a larger number of firms attractive targets. All else
being equal, the increased population of potential targets increases
bidder incentive to search by raising the likelihood that a bidder
can locate a target of sufficient attraction. 1
There is no apparent reason to believe that the first impact
dominates the second, or vice versa. The issue is empirical. If the
first impact, reduced bidder search, dominates, the externality is
indeed an external cost, and shareholders in potential targets will
want the resistance of other targets weakened. But if the second
Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 6, at 372.
11 See id. at 373-74. More technically, the externality must be marginal rather than infra-
marginal if this second condition is to be met. Id. at 374.
60 Id. Because the desire of one party to alter the other's behavior is only one of several
conditions that must be met if legal intervention is to be justified, Buchanan and Stub-
blebine refer to externalities satisfying this particular criterion as only "potentially rele-
vant." Id. at 373.
"! An example underlines the point. A person is not required to accept the first marriage
proposal received. One may spurn the first (or nth) suitor, even though that creates a risk of
never getting a better offer. But the amount of search for spouses does not necessarily fall
when such discretion is tolerated. True, the possibility of being refused is a disincentive to
suitors' search, all other things equal. But the ability to refuse unattractive suitors makes
marriage itself more desirable, and so gives a potential partner greater incentive to develop
(i.e., invest in) attributes or skills that make him or her more likely to be approached by an
acceptable suitor. Because potential partners are then more desirable, there will be more
search, by more suitors.
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effect, increased incentive to search, dominates, the externality is a
relevant external benefit, and shareholders will prefer that the
ability of other targets to resist be strengthened. If the first and
second impacts offset each other, the externality is irrelevant and
need not be considered further.
Still a fourth condition necessary to justify legal "correction" of
a relevant external cost requires that the cost of correction be less
than the losses arising from the externality.62 In other words, the
parties must be missing gains from trade because of some condi-
tion remediable by legal authority. By focusing solely on the bene-
fits perceived from a no-resistance rule, Easterbrook and Fischel
imply that the costs of correcting externalities due to resistance are
negligible, even non-existent.6 3 But as was noted in Part I, losses
do arise from using a no-resistance rule to control the externality
at issue, because initial investment incentives are altered. In effect,
the technique suggested for controlling the perceived externality,
non-resistance, has external effects of its own. Other commentators
'have noted still other costs.6 4 Because no determination has yet
been made of whether the costs of the original externality exceed
or fall short of the costs of the externality created by removing the
first, one must fall back on intuition to determine support or oppo-
sition for a no-resistance rule-an uncomfortable resolution at
best.
The fifth and final condition necessary to justify legal interven-
tion to correct a Pareto-relevant externality is high private costs of
internalization relative to the costs of public control.6 5 Government
solutions to problems cannot be optimal if private solutions are
6 As Buchanan and Stubblebine note:
[T]he observation of external effects, taken alone, cannot provide a basis for judg-
ment concerning the desirability of some modification in an existing state of affairs.
There is not a prima facie case for intervention in all cases where an externality is
observed to exist. The internal benefits from carrying out the activity, net of costs,
may be greater than the external damage that is imposed on other parties.
Buchanan & Stubblebine, supra note 6, at 381 (footnote omitted). Buchanan and Stub-
blebine refer to externalities satisfying this condition as "Pareto-relevant." Id. at 374-75.
U According to Easterbrook and Fischel, both shareholders and bidders benefit from
mandatory non-resistance. Auctions, supra note 2, at 7-9.
See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
' Demsetz makes the same point:
[Piroperty rights convey the right to benefit or harm oneself or others .... What
converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an externality is that the cost of bringing
the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting persons is too
1987]
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cheaper. This final necessary condition does not seem to be met in
the case of tender offers. Private internalization of any relevant
externality appears to be available at modest cost, as is explained
in the next Part. If so, a no-resistance rule is inappropriate even if
all the other necessary conditions for government intervention are
met, which is a problematic supposition in its own right.
III. PRIVATE SOLUTIONS TO THE "PROBLEM" OF TAKEOVER
RESISTANCE
If resistance generates Pareto-relevant, non-pecuniary externali-
ties, they will be internalized when property rights are well defined
and transaction (contracting) costs are low.6 The common law has
granted target firms unambiguous property rights to resist tender
offers. That leaves the other issue: whether other potential targets,
the alleged victims of the externalities created by target firm resis-
tance, can achieve contractually the level of bidder monitoring
they prefer. If so, they can avoid the external effect that would
otherwise exist. If potential targets can credibly bond themselves
not to resist a tender offer, outside bidders in the market for cor-
porate control will not reduce their level of scrutiny and monitor-
ing. In that event, government intervention cannot be justified.
The monitoring of targets by bidders is not free; firms that get
more of it will pay for the increase. A no-resistance promise, giving
more of the expected takeover gain to bidders, is one way to pay
for more monitoring. A firm selects the level of scrutiny by select-
ing the price of being acquired. Non-resistance means a lower ex-
pected price and so increases scrutiny. If a firm can credibly prom-
ise not to resist a takeover, it cannot be affected by other targets'
resistance, and there cannot be any relevant externality.
Those who would ban defensive tactics because of alleged exter-
nalities implicitly assume that prospective targets cannot promise
not to resist, that bidders cannot cheaply be informed of these
promises, or that bidders will not believe the promises. But intra-
firm contracts and third-party bonding through the formal rules of
the organized stock exchanges allow firms to choose the level of
resistance, and thus of monitoring, for which they are willing to
high to make it worthwhile ....
Demsetz, supra note 12, at 347-48.
" See Coase, supra note 53, at 15-16.
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pay. There is, in short, no inevitable pecuniary or technological
externality.
A. Shareholder Agreements
The obvious place for shareholders to invoke a ban on defensive
tactics is within the firm itself. In theory, shareholders could use
their firms' articles of incorporation to specify the types and
amounts of defensive tactics their managers could use. But there
are two potential problems with such intrafirm contracts: pre-bid
agency problems created by unfaithful managers, and post-bid op-
portunism against bidders by shareholders.
1. Pre-Bid Agency Costs
When ownership is widely dispersed, no one shareholder will
find it worthwhile to draft, and to obtain adoption of, corporate
charter changes. If changes are to be made, they must originate
with management. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that since man-
agers want to keep their jobs, they are unlikely to draft or support
charter amendments or changes in bylaws that encourage tender
offers.67 But other contractual devices-phantom stock plans,
stock option plans, and "golden parachute" contracts, for exam-
ple-can align the interests of managers and shareholders in the
event of a hostile tender offer.68 Indeed, as Easterbrook and Fis-
chel have recognized in another context, "[p]ublicly held corpora-
tions have developed a wide range of governance mechanisms that
align managers' interests more closely with those of investors. '69
Such internal arrangements are admittedly costly, but so is any
method designed to induce monitoring. At the other extreme,
shareholders might do no internal monitoring, relying instead on
increased monitoring from outside bidders. But as noted above,
more outside monitoring must be purchased by forgoing takeover
premiums so as to promise greater gains to outside bidders.
Contractual devices like golden parachutes merely substitute costly
'7 Proper Role, supra note 2, at 1175, 1181.
"8 See Knoeber, supra note 33, at 159-61; Lambert & Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Execu-
tive Decision-Making, and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. Acct. & Econ. 179, 184-85, 200-01
(1985).
" Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271,
277-78 (1986).
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internal monitoring mechanisms for costly external monitoring by
bidders. But there is no reason to think that internal monitoring is
always more costly, particularly since the internal devices are ap-
proved by shareholders themselves.
Suppose arguendo that as takeovers loom, job-conscious manag-
ers can frustrate passage of amendments to the articles of incorpo-
ration that are in shareholders' interests. This possibility does not
dispose of the issue, however. At the time of an initial public offer-
ing of securities there is no agency problem, because there is no
separation of ownership and control. At this juncture shareholders
would pay lower prices for the shares of firms that did not bar
defensive tactics, if shareholders unambiguously would benefit
from a no-resistance rule. Agency problems evolve subsequently
due to the costliness of foreseeing all plausible eventualities.70 But
if non-resistance unambiguously maximizes the present expected
value of a corporation, it should present no initial difficulties of
foresight. The founding shareholders of a corporation have a
strong incentive to install internal governance rules that investors
consider optimal. If it were indeed value-maximizing to do so,
fledgling firms would install stringent rules prohibiting defensive
tactics before hiring outside managers, and would install provisions
making it hard to alter the anti-defensive rules. Ordinarily they do
none of these things.
2. Post-Bid Shareholder Opportunism
An objection to the notion that initial charter provisions can
limit the resistance that bidders will expect arises from the ability
of shareholders to change their charter opportunistically when a
takeover is anticipated. Post-bid resistance is profitable. Any firm
can adopt and announce a policy forbidding defensive tactics, but
target shareholders can revoke the earlier policy and create an auc-
tion market after a bid is launched. Shareholders of all firms would
be harmed if bidders could not distinguish firms that are likely to
resist a bid from those that are not.7 1 If bidders cannot distinguish,
perhaps new law is called for, but only to ensure that firms honor
70 See Grossman & Hart, supra note 30, at 48.
71 Actually, few firms would keep their promises if bidders could not tell the difference.
See Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84
Q.J. Econ. 488, 495-96 (1970).
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their promises to refrain from resistance, not to bar all resistance.
But this point seems moot. Firms can credibly bind themselves
not to resist. Time is of the essence in struggles for corporate con-
trol. Shareholders can insert one provision in their charters to for-
bid all defensive tactics (or a specified subset) and another to pre-
vent any changes in the charter until a specified period has passed.
Such provisions would protect bidders from shareholder opportu-
nism unless bidders were forced to reveal their intentions far in
advance of their takeover move.72
Even without such delaying provisions, the structure of the cor-
porate governance process prevents shareholders from making
rapid changes in their articles of incorporation. Substantive
changes require a shareholder vote,73 which takes time, particularly
if shareholders are widely dispersed. Furthermore, the mechanisms
of soliciting proxies are controlled by federal rules7 4 which again
create delay. These delays give prospective bidders additional as-
surance that firms banning defensive tactics cannot change their
articles before a transfer of control occurs.
These bonding mechanisms are not "perfect," i.e., costless. But
again, as with internal monitoring devices and the control of exter-
nalities, the cost of bonds must be compared to the costs of alter-
natives. It may be that a legal rule would provide enforcement of
firms' no-resistance promises more cheaply than would private
bonding. If so, the appropriate legal response is to enforce volun-
tarily offered target promises rather than to ban all resistance. If
firms are truly better off eschewing resistance, such a legal rule
would allow them to choose credible no-resistance policies. If
shareholders do wish to allow bargaining, however, the rule would
7' Perhaps the Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 781-78n (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), has forced bidders to reveal their inten-
tions so far in advance that preexisting corporate charters now offer insufficient restraints
on resistance. But if that is so, the solution is not more law, but less-repeal or modification
of the Williams Act.
73 See, e.g., Revised Model Business Corp. Act, §§ 10.01-.03 (1985); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 242 (b)(1)-(2) (1974).
7' The solicitation of proxies is controlled by the Securities Exchange Act, § 14, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n (1982 & Supp. III 1985), and by Regulation 14A of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (1986). SEC Rule 14a-6 requires that five copies of all proxy
statements and accompanying forms be filed with the SEC ten days prior to the date such
material is given to stockholders, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (1986), although the SEC may
authorize a reduction in the ten-day period "upon a showing of good cause therefor." Id.
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not preclude this possibility. Unlike the Easterbrook-Fischel pro-
posal simply to ban resistance, a bond-enforcing rule would not
bring with it the risk of firms losing the benefits of bargaining de-
tailed in Part I.
B. Third-Party Bonds
When doubts exist about contractual reliability outside the cor-
porate control market, third-party bonding to assure performance
often resolves them.7 5 Similarly, bonding could be used in the cor-
porate context to ensure that firms promising to refrain from re-
sisting outside bids will keep their promises. An explicit or implicit
no-resistance bond could be posted with a third-party fiduciary, its
value exceeding the expected gains from resisting once a bid mate-
rialized. The bond would be forfeited if the firm breached its
promises. If credible mechanisms exist to bond shareholders to
their promised responses to takeover bids, firms can choose their
desired level of bidder monitoring by adjusting the contractual
level of resistance.
State laws barring resistance by target firms comprise one possi-
ble sort of third-party bond. It is often suggested that state corpo-
ration statutes, reflecting interstate competition for charter reve-
nues, furnish the most efficient rules of corporate governance.7 6 If
so, some states could enact no-resistance rules, and firms desiring
to bond themselves to those rules could incorporate there. By sub-
jecting themselves to suit if they violated the statute, firms would
bond themselves not to resist. Thus the observed failure of states
75 See Knoeber, An Alternative Mechanism to Assure Contractual Reliability, 12 J. Legal
Stud. 333, 335-43 (1983) (describing the merits and costs of third-party bonding arrange-
ments, particularly in the farming industry); Klein & Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615, 635-37 (1981) (suggesting that
third-party enforcement is often the cheapest method of assuring performance).
7' See R. Winter, Government and the Corporation 7-11 (1978); Fischel, The "Race to the
Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76
Nw. U.L. Rev. 913, 919-20 (1982); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the The-
ory of the Corporation, 6 J. Legal Stud. 251, 289-92 (1977). But see Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663, 666 (1974) (competition among
states for revenues has led to permissive corporation statutes which "have watered the
rights of shareholders vis-A-vis management down to a thin gruel"); Fischel, Efficient Capi-
tal Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender
Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1978) (competition among states may not be effective because
a "corporation may be subject to the tender offer statutes of several states even if incorpo-
rated in a state with no such statute").
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to adopt a no-resistance rule may suggest that firms do not de-
mand bonding.77
If, for some reason, bonding through state law proved insuffi-
cient, the organized stock exchanges could serve as third-party
guarantors of firms' promises of non-resistance. The exchanges
have incentives to devise rules maximizing listed firms' values.7 8 A
firm will select as its forum for trading the exchange with the best
rules for that firm's circumstances.
Originally, simply listing on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) assured prospective bidders that the firm would not vio-
late the exchange's rules. In the days before sophisticated com-
puter technology, the NYSE was a natural monopoly. Firms that
flouted exchange rules were delisted and lost access to this central
marketplace, with a consequent fall in the firm's share prices. The
long-term prospective loss of liquidity from delisting imposed costs
on shareholders that reduced the attraction of short-term gains
from violating exchange rules.
Thus if firms could have gained by having enforceable no-resis-
tance rules, the NYSE should have had them. Long before federal
regulation of securities trading, the NYSE required independent
audits and certain timely disclosures, and specified shareholder
17 Cf. Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ.
& Organiz. 225, 265-73 (1985) (statistical analysis indicates that firms experience positive
returns as a result of reincorporating in Delaware to deter takeovers). At first blush it may
seem that an individual state will be unable to enforce its statute forbidding resistance. A
firm might initially locate in a state with strict limitations on defensive tactics, but then
reincorporate in a lenient state when a takeover seems imminent. But a state mandating
non-resistance could require all firms incorporating there to post a monetary bond, which
would be forfeited if the firm exited the state when a takeover threatened.
Another problem with relying on states to provide bonding services for firms wishing to
make credible promises of no resistance is that individual states may, for their own reasons,
prefer to encourage rather than help discourage resistance. States with strict statutes forbid-
ding resistance would lose tax revenues from firms that were taken over by corporations
outside of the state, and these losses might not be offset by the increased revenues from
chartering that came from providing a no-resistance rule. If that were true, of course, the
value of no-resistance bonding to firms, and, hence, to the states would have to be modest.
Otherwise, at least one state would make a market in no-resistance charters, because the
revenue-maximizing level of fees is endogenous, increasing as the number of closely compet-
ing states declined.
7' See Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence,
9 Del. J. Corp. L. 540, 556 (1984) [hereinafter Managers' Discretion] ("The willingness of
people to trade depends . . . on their belief that they will get a fair deal. Thus it is in the
interest of stock exchanges to establish rules for the protection of investors, and managers
who seek to attract money will submit to these rules.").
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voting rights for listed firms.79 But the NYSE has never had any-
thing like a general no-resistance rule. Only two NYSE rules con-
ceivably could be construed as discouraging defensive tactics, and
these also serve purposes unrelated to takeovers. Listed firms must
obtain shareholder approval before issuing new stock exceeding
eighteen percent of the value of the firm's outstanding stock,80 and
dual classes of voting stock are not allowed.81 But the most com-
mon sorts of resistance-shark repellants, greenmail and the
like-have never been limited by the NYSE. The absence of NYSE
rules forbidding defensive tactics seems inconsistent with the argu-
ment that the market's anticipation of resistance to a takeover de-
creases a firm's value.
There are indications that technological innovations have raised
the ex ante costs of bonding through listing on the NYSE. Today,
with cheap electronic communications available to everyone, the
NYSE faces competition from the over-the-counter market and
other exchanges. The presence of these rivals has diminished the
value of the bond that NYSE listing once represented to prospec-
tive bidders.8 2 Although the emergence of rival markets might ex-
plain why no exchange has adopted rules forbidding defensive tac-
tics, it is significant that the NYSE never adopted rules forbidding
resistance even when it had little fear of losing listings.
But despite the modern competition among them, the exchanges
" Benston, Security for Investors, in Instead of Regulation 169, 170 (R. Poole ed. 1982);
Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evi-
dence, 26 J.L. & Econ. 613, 629 (1983).
80 Managers' Discretion, supra note 78, at 556.
81 But see NYSE Formally Submits Proposal To Allow Unequal Voting Rights, 18 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 37, at 1337 (Sept. 19, 1986) (NYSE submits plan to SEC for
allowing two stock classes with unequal voting rights, to prevent migration to other ex-
changes); id. at 1389 (text of proposed changes in NYSE rules).
82 Neither the National Association of Securities Dealers (the industry self-regulatory or-
ganization that governs trading in the over-the-counter market) nor the American Stock
Exchange forbids its listed firms' from adopting dual stock classes with unequal voting
rights. Recently, several NYSE-listed firms considered to be likely takeover targets violated
exchange rules by adopting dual classes of stock with different voting rights (so-called
"super shares") to avoid hostile takeovers. See Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Com-
mon and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 75 Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming Oct. 1987).
Rather than enforce its rule and lose listings to these competing markets, the NYSE has
proposed changing its rules regarding voting rights for common stock. See supra note 81. At
present, though, a firm can claim to be bonding itself not to engage in certain defensive
tactics by listing on the NYSE, but then jump to another exchange or to the over-the-
counter market when a bidder commits himself.
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still represent separate legal entities with standing to sue, a stand-
ing that is not contingent on the contracting party remaining listed
on that exchange. The emergence of rival exchanges means only
that listing firms no longer bond themselves automatically to obey
the rules of specific exchanges. Firms can sign legally enforceable
bonding contracts with the exchanges. A firm could voluntarily
bond itself by signing a contract with an exchange specifying a sum
that the firm would forfeit if it resisted a hostile bid for control."
The bond would lessen the gains that a target might realize from
defensive tactics. If shareholders valued such bonds, exchanges
themselves would benefit from serving as guarantors or bonders,
by providing a service of value to their listed firms and so being
able to share in any of the resulting gains.
Because target firms can post bonds with exchanges, firms that
desire more outside surveillance by potential bidders can purchase
it, though two transactions (listing and bonding) may now be re-
quired where one sufficed earlier. External bonding admittedly is
costly-as is any other device to obtain the level of monitoring the
firm wants. The point is, first, that institutions with an incentive
and an ability to bond targets' promises already exist. Moreover,
the costs of writing effective and enforceable bonds appear to be
slight, compared to the obviously costly alternative of banning val-
uable resistance. If Easterbrook and Fischel are correct that future
target firms are systematically the victims of present target resis-
tance, it is remarkable that none of the entities with an interest in
the problem has done anything to solve it.
C. Firm Variety and Legal Default Rules
The amount of resistance the firm chooses, relying where neces-
sary on bonds to bolster its pledges, determines the amount of ex-
ternal monitoring it receives in the market for corporate control.
Firm owners can combine this external monitoring with internal
governance mechanisms of their own, depending on the relative
prices of external and internal devices, to achieve the optimal set
of monitoring inputs overall. But different firms will demand vary-
ing amounts of monitoring, since they have managers with differ-
ent attributes, industrial structures posing different problems, and
83 See Knoeber, supra note 75, at 335-36.
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different organizational practices. Likewise, to achieve a given level
of monitoring, different firms will find it optimal to mix different
amounts of the various monitoring inputs available.8 4
A principal disadvantage of a no-resistance rule is its inflexibil-
ity in the face of firms' demands for different types and degrees of
monitoring."5 A no-resistance rule forces at least some firms to buy
more outside monitoring than they want. There is no such thing as
the efficient amount of external monitoring inputs across firms,
any more than there is a single optimum amount of labor or capital
across all firms in all industries. Railroads have different capital-
labor ratios than do drycleaning establishments. Similarly, differ-
ent firms will prefer different combinations of external and inter-
nal monitoring inputs.
Casual empiricism verifies this phenomenon. Shareholders in
many firms have agreed to restrict the payment of greenmail, or
have refused to install poison pill provisions in their charters.
Others have not.86 Internally, many firms have stock option plans
and golden parachute agreements. Others do not.
In the face of such diversity in the use of monitoring inputs, the
law's attempts to correct supposed imperfections must be cautious.
The corporation is itself a set of contracts linking shareholders, di-
84 See Managers' Discretion, supra note 78, at 543-53; Jensen, supra note 15, at 324.
Shareholders have other mechanisms besides the market for corporate control to monitor
managers, such as frequent trips to the capital markets, which subject firms to the scrutiny
of investment banks and other institutional monitors. See Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost
Explanations of Dividends, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 650, 652-56 (1984); Jensen,
supra note 15, at 324. Use of outside auditors, independent directors, and management con-
sultants can also be an effective monitoring device. In addition, the market for managerial
labor rewards and punishes managerial performance as appropriate. All else being equal,
shareholders who utilize more of these other monitoring devices will demand less monitoring
by takeover bidders, and will want their firms to engage in more defensive tactics in order to
realize the full value of their monitoring activities.
81 "Politics is the art of compromise because political outcomes are very indivisible. The
greater divisibility of market outcomes makes business the art of serving new wants without
compromising old ones." H. Demsetz, Economic, Legal, and Political Dimensions of Compe-
tition 76 (1982). Perhaps this discussion seems to overstate a firm's ability to "fine tune"
the allowable resistance prospectively. But a court does not have perfect foresight either.
Judicial enforcement of a uniform and compulsory no-resistance rule would provide less
flexibility than would interpretation of a voluntary no-resistance contract.
86 See Baysinger & Butler, Antitakeover Amendments, Managerial Entrenchment, and
the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1257, 1257-59 (1985). Baysinger
and Butler note that, though "many large corporations have adopted charter and bylaw
amendments that discourage unsolicited tender offers," not all corporations have adopted
such devices. Id.
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rectors, managers and others.8 7 The role of corporate law thus is
enforcement of the explicit terms of the contracts, plus the more
difficult default role of supplying terms to cover contingencies that
the contracting parties did not explicitly contemplate in the con-
tracts. As Easterbrook and Fischel note, corporate law should sup-
ply "standard form 'contracts' of the sort shareholders would be
likely to choose." '
The desirability of legal default rules diminishes as the number
of plausible choices available to the contracting parties increases.
When, as in the takeover setting, there are dozens of internal and
external monitoring choices available, and thus many thousands of
possible input combinations, the likelihood that an appreciable
number of firms would choose extremely large or extremely small
amounts of many of those inputs is practically nil. Yet that is what
a no-resistance rule would accomplish, by prohibiting firms from
purchasing any combination of inputs that did not maximize
outside monitoring. Such a rule would force an appreciable number
of firms to purchase more external monitoring (thus inducing less
internal monitoring) than they would prefer. It is unlikely, that is,
that many shareholders would wish to write the sort of contract
that Easterbrook and Fischel's no-resistance rule would impose
upon them.
As a standard-form contract for shareholders, the Easterbrook-
Fischel proposal has a second defect. While a legal default rule
merely forces all firms to accept the same missing term when they
fail to provide for some contingency, the Easterbrook-Fischel pro-
posal would override the explicit terms of charter provisions, em-
ployment agreements, and the like, when those contracts allowed
managerial resistance to takeovers. Easterbrook and Fischel's rule
is thus not a default option, around which firms can contract as
they please. Rather, it mandates a set level of resis-
87 See R. Posner, supra note 38, at 369-72; Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 28, at 787-88;
Baysinger & Butler, supra note 86, at 1285-88.
s Proper Role, supra note 2, at 1182. Assigning the default role to the law does not deter-
mine which legal institution will be responsible for filling in corporate contracts. Judges can
supply missing contractual terms case by case. Or, the legislature can lay down a single rule
to cover all contingencies. Each system has its benefits and costs. Judicial resolution of con-
troversies permits consideration of the particularities of each case, but may be more time-
consuming. Legislative action may consume less time, but a single rule that is applied to all
situations may not fit the facts of a particular case.
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tance-zero-regardless of the level shareholders have chosen. A
no-resistance rule would effectively tear up those resistance-au-
thorizing charter provisions to which shareholders themselves have
agreed.
No legal rule in this area can be optimal unless it is an option.
Firms that wish to avail themselves of the option can thereby
lower transaction costs by not drafting and negotiating specific
provisions in their contracts. But not all firms will find the legal
prescription that is chosen appropriate. The ability of firms to con-
tract around costly legal rules when lower-cost private alternatives
are available must be a feature of any efficient standard-form
contract.
Default options, like everything else, have their costs. In the
takeover context, they may create uncertainty among bidders
about what resistance rules a particular target has in force. But
institutions like stock exchanges make it their business to mini-
mize these costs. Moreover, firms that adopt no-resistance rules
thereby increase the potential gains available to bidders in order to
attract increased takeover attention. These firms then have every
incentive to let bidders know what they have done, and bidders
have every incentive to search for that information. In short, then,
the legal system should limit itself to providing a default option,
rather than imposing a no-resistance rule that overrides the rules
that firms may wish to provide for themselves.
Of course, permitting firms to contract around legal rules means
that courts must sometimes interpret and enforce contracts. But a
rule requiring managerial passivity in the face of a takeover bid
also requires costly interpretation and enforcement. As Easter-
brook and Fischel concede, "many legitimate business decisions
could have the effect of making the corporation less attractive to
the bidder and thus could be called resistance. . . .Distinguishing
resistance from passivity will be simple in some cases and hard in
others." 89
Nor does it follow that corporate contracting should be ignored
in the takeover context because some forms of resistance, such as
poison pills or greenmail, were unknown at the time contracts were
written. Legislatures are no more capable of predicting appropriate
rules for things that do not exist than are the original entrepre-
89 Id. at 1202.
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neurs. Whatever statutory language a legislature might choose to
proscribe takeover defenses is equally available to firms themselves
if they want to use it.
IV. AGENCY COSTS
Whether or not important externalities attend takeover resis-
tance, Easterbrook and Fischel believe resistance is undesirable be-
cause managers will resist to save their jobs, not to benefit their
shareholders.90 Indeed, to Easterbrook and Fischel the very exis-
tence of tender offers shows agency problems in target firms. Com-
binations between firms could occur through friendly mergers,
which they claim dissipate fewer resources than hostile tender of-
fers.9 1 A bidder's resort to a tender offer, Easterbrook and Fischel
argue, reveals target firm managers to have been protecting them-
selves by refusing to facilitate a beneficial merger alternative for
shareholders.2
Mergers remain by far the most prevalent form of interfirm com-
bination, while tender offers are comparatively rare.93 This obser-
vation suggests that significant agency costs do not typify the take-
over process, even by Easterbrook and Fischel's standards. It is
also noteworthy that, for Easterbrook and Fischel, agency costs
seem to be a significant problem only for tender offers. As Easter-
brook has reported elsewhere, overwhelming empirical evidence
from various aspects of corporate governance suggests that faithful
managers are rewarded while the faithless are punished.9 4 Share-
holders apparently do monitor, and do devise corporate governance
90 Id. at 1174-75. According to Easterbrook and Fischel, target firm managers create no
wealth in the corporate control market. Rather, they reduce wealth by resisting takeover
attempts in order to save their jobs. In the Easterbrook and Fischel model, only bidders
create wealth, by locating and acquiring undervalued assets and transferring them to higher-
valued uses. Id at 1173-77. But as Part I noted, the takeover process involves inputs from
targets, bidders, and broker-intermediaries such as investment bankers.
" Id. at 1169 (benefits of takeovers "could be achieved by friendly merger as well as by
hostile tender offer," but a "tender offer is by far the more costly device"). To support this
empirical claim, Easterbrook and Fischel cite a study of tender offer costs, but offer no data
concerning the cost of mergers. See id. at 1169 n.22.
"I See id. at 1169, 1174-75.
'3 For a summary of the data, see Knoeber, supra note 33, at 155 n.1. In 1982, the most
recent year reported, tender offers constituted only four percent of all acquisition
announcements.
'" Managers' Discretion, supra note 78, at 547-52.
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mechanisms that impose the costs of agency on agents them-
selves.95 In advocating a no-resistance rule, Easterbrook and Fis-
chel do not explain why tender offers are unique.
Especially curious is Easterbrook and Fischel's preference for
mergers, rather than takeovers, to avoid agency costs. The poten-
tial for agency problems is no less in friendly mergers than in hos-
tile tender offers. Managers of firms acquired in friendly mergers
often receive substantial lump-sum payments from the acquiring
firm or, alternatively, job guarantees for themselves prior to sub-
mitting the proposal to shareholders. 9 Moreover, managers typi-
cally do not accept the first bid from the prospective partner.
Rather, they "resist" by bargaining for a better deal before submit-
ting the offer for shareholder consideration. In negotiating merger
terms, target firm managers seem to extract much, if not all, of the
available gain from the combination, leaving the bidding firm with
only a competitive rate of return. 7 Such hard bargaining presum-
ably decreases the interest of other bidders in seeking merger
targets, which again means less monitoring throughout the econ-
omy. If mergers are preferable to hostile tender offers, why is man-
agerial resistance appropriate for the former but not the latter?98
This is not to deny that resistance (in the face of either merger
offers or tender offers) can sometimes be used opportunistically by
management.9 But as Part I pointed out, the ability to resist also
"' Demsetz expresses similar skepticism about the importance, relevance, or even meaning
of agency costs. See Structure of Ownership, supra note 24; cf. Alchian, Corporate Manage-
ment and Property Rights, in Economic Policy and the Regulation of Corporate Securities
337, 344-47 (H. Manne ed. 1969) (agency costs are higher because of dispersion of control
among shareholders, but other advantages of this form of enterprise outweigh those costs).
"See, e.g., Hawkins, Tull Execs Guaranteed Pay for 3 Years in Buy-Out Plan, Atlanta
Const., Mar. 27, 1985, at B3, col. 5.
'7 See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 16, at 9-16.
98 Easterbrook and Fischel also overlook the fact that management's ability to enhance
gains in merger negotiations depends on its ability to resist tender offers. A bidder encoun-
tering hard bargaining for a merger can go directly to shareholders by launching a tender
offer. A target's tough line in merger negotiations is not credible if management can do
nothing against a tender offer to force the bidder back to the merger bargaining table.
By the same token, a bidder's ability to resort to a hostile tender offer tempers the de-
mands that a target can make at the merger table. The acquisition of Sperry by Burroughs
illustrates how a bidder can try to outmaneuver a target by combining a hostile tender offer
with a friendly merger offer. See Crudele, Persistence Pays Off in Burroughs Deal, N.Y.
Times, May 28, 1986, at D1, col. 4; Buss & Hertzberg, Sperry Is Said To Meet Today on
Higher Bid, Wall St. J., May 27, 1986, at 3, col. 4.
" Partly because there are so many reasons behind corporate takeovers, see supra notes
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can convey long-run benefits to shareholders. Whenever use of a
tool such as resistance creates both costs and benefits for share-
holders, they will want to optimize rather than eradicate its use.
15-16 and accompanying text, the empirical studies often cannot distinguish between desir-
able and undesirable takeover activities. See Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate
Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197 (1986). Moreover, the empirical evidence on the effects of man-
agement resistance to takeover bids is itself complex and often contradictory. Empirical
studies on greenmail, for example, are equivocal, but seem to indicate that target firms are
better off when a raider buys into them and then is paid greenmail for his shares than they
would be if greenmail were banned. See Macey & McChesney, supra note 7, at 43-48. Like-
wise, shareholders apparently benefit when management resists takeovers ex post by filing
antitrust actions. Jarrell, supra note 53, at 175. Study of ex ante antitakeover amendments
has generated more inconclusive results. DeAngelo and Rice find that such amendments
produce insignificant results on adopting firms' share prices. DeAngelo & Rice, Antitakeover
Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 329, 355 (1983). Linn and
McConnell find that such amendments have significant positive effects on adopters' share
prices. Linn & McConnell, An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of "Antitakeover
Amendments" on Common Stock Prices, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 361, 397 (1983). A study by the
SEC's Office of the Chief Economist, on the other hand, finds that antitakeover amend-
ments have significant negative effects on share prices, although one type of amendment,
fair-price provisions, has no effect at all. See Office of the Chief Economist, SEC, Shark
Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover Amendments Since 1980, at 43
(July 24, 1985). This evidence is especially curious because the amendments studied were
"[a]lmost always subject to approval by majority vote of shareholders." Id. at 1.
In addition, a defensive tactic may hurt some but not all of the firms that adopt it. This is
shown by another study by the Office of the Chief Economist, which looks at share price
changes in firms adopting poison pills. Office of the Chief Economist, SEC, The Effects of
Poison Pills on the Wealth of Target Shareholders (Oct. 23, 1986). The study concludes that
such devices have significant negative effects overall. Id. at 43. But it finds that, of firms
adopting poison pills during control battles, the number that lost value when the pill de-
feated the takeover equaled the number that gained when the pill led to a later takeover at
a higher price. Id. at 41. Such equivocal evidence hardly justifies a rule that supposedly
would benefit firms that might not want a poison pill, but would prevent an equal number
of firms from using a pill to benefit themselves.
Thus, the empirical case for banning resistance to takeovers is as unsettled as the theoret-
ical argument. The empirical case, however, is largely irrelevant to our argument here. The
typical event study examines the effect of a defensive tactic at the time it is imposed, nor-
mally as a response to a takeover bid. See, e.g., Dann & DeAngelo, Corporate Financial
Policy and Corporate Control: A Study of Defensive Adjustments in Asset and Ownership
Structure (rev. ed. Aug. 1986) (Managerial Economics Research Center, University of Roch-
ester, Working Paper No. 86-11) (finding that managerial responses to attempted hostile
takeovers by changes in asset or ownership structure have significant negative effects on
firm share prices). Even if agency costs are significant at the time of an attempted takeover,
the benefits of having a bargaining rule in effect will long since have been incorporated into
share prices. An event study at the time of the takeover will miss these benefits.
HeinOnline -- 73 Va. L. Rev.  739 1987
Virginia Law Review
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has analyzed the role of bargaining in
the context of alternative structures of property rights, and has ap-
plied that analysis to bargaining for corporate control. Bargaining
is the hallmark of exchanges in thin markets. It is no accident that
maximizing the value of assets often requires investments that
owners cannot expect to be valued accurately by "objective" tech-
niques, but only by negotiation. By definition, these investments
involve more asset-specific risk, the management of which requires
asset-specific investments in human capital. That capital can be
expropriated unless bargaining is permitted.
It would be astounding if weakening well-defined property rights
increased welfare. An externally imposed rule substituting liability
for property protection can benefit neither bidders nor targets. It
reduces the incentive to create value in potential targets. It causes
too many bidders to search too much, too soon. There are good
reasons why such a rule is not observed in other thin markets, even
those in which sellers commonly use agents, and in which the
good-faith efforts of the agent are costly to measure.
In baseball, for example, putting a player on revocable waivers
creates the same sort of externality decried by Easterbrook and
Fischel. If a claim is made for the player on waivers, the team own-
ing his contract can revoke the waivers and either keep the player
or begin bargaining with the team filing the claim. The bidding
team has spent real resources evaluating the player relative to its
own circumstances, and the ability to revoke the waivers may well
reduce the number of bids. Yet all teams mutually agree to the
system of revocable waivers as part of the rules of major-league
baseball; presumptively therefore, it is optimal for baseball teams
as a group. There is nothing special about corporate control that
would justify a different rule for tender offers.
Unfettered discretion by asset owners over future bargaining
strategies cannot be shown to be inferior to a mandatory no-resis-
tance rule. Target firms can contract for any level and type of
monitoring for which they are prepared to bear the unavoidable
resource costs. If they wish, they may bond through both internal
and external means any no-resistance promise they may make to
potential bidders. The externality problem is a mirage. Imposing a
single rule on firms with varying demands for outside monitoring
would itself create inefficiencies where none now exist.
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If the legal structure currently will not enforce voluntary com-
mitments not to resist, the appropriate legal change is to enforce
those promises, not to require non-resistance as a matter of law.
Admittedly, judicial ability to interpret voluntary commitments is
neither costless nor perfect. But to require costless perfection of a
policy is to succumb to the Nirvana fallacy. The appropriate stan-
dard is not perfection but a real-world alternative. Against that
standard it is difficult to imagine how voluntary commitments can
be more costly to enforce than are compulsory ones.
Management had a lesser role in tender offers before the Wil-
liams Act established mandatory waiting periods during which ten-
ders cannot be completed.100 The delay now required gives target
managers greater opportunity to employ a variety of defensive tac-
tics (e.g., poison pills, greenmail, and share repurchases) to fend off
first and even subsequent bids. By lengthening the period over
which tender offers are outstanding, the Williams Act may have
weakened implicit commitments not to resist. But if so, the solu-
tion is to repeal or modify the Williams Act, not to add a new layer
of immobilizing constrants 0 1
As noted at several junctures above, resolution of all aspects of
the controversy over resistance, particularly the externality issue,
cannot be done at a purely theoretical level; some empirical judg-
ments are required. Neither the proponents nor the opponents of
managerial bargaining have provided quantitative evidence to sup-
port their position. But surely, given that low-cost private contrac-
tual solutions are available to solve any externality, and given that
practically all other thin markets have evolved exchange rules al-
lowing bargaining, the burden of persuasion must be on those who
would ban bargaining. Likewise, firms differently situated inevita-
bly want different bargaining rules, and are observed to impose
different rules on themselves. Consequently, opponents of bargain-
"'0 See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982) (provision indirectly forcing all offers to remain open
at least seven days, by allowing shareholders to withdraw proffered shares during that pe-
riod); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1986) (SEC rule extending the minimum offering period
to 15 business days from the commencement of the tender offer); id. § 240.14d-7(a)(2) (SEC
rule extending period of offer for 10 business days after another bidder has entered a com-
peting bid for the same class of securities).
101 In any case, if the interest groups benefited by the Williams Act are too powerful to
permit its repeal or modification, they probably can avoid its indirect gutting as well. If so,
indirect attacks on the Williams Act are doomed, and need not occupy our time and energy
further.
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ing must shoulder the burden of showing why these private con-
tractual solutions are undesirable, and why a single rule for all
firms would be an improvement.
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